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The War republics in the Donbas one year after the outbreak 
of the conflict 
Tomasz Piechal
More than one year since the first pro-Russian moves in the Donbas, separatists have taken 
control of parts of the Donbas and Luhansk oblasts but are still unable to form truly func-
tioning administrative structures. The exercise of power by the central administration of the 
so-called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ (DPR) and ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ (LPR) is restricted 
to resolving problems as they arise, while administration proper is the prerogative of the local 
authorities reporting to them which had been performing this function before the conflict 
broke out. The way the situation is developing and the fact that access to information is re-
stricted make it difficult to determine the structure of the separatist government in more de-
tail, precisely how it is organised, and what the internal hierarchy is like. The overriding goal 
of the governments of the DPR and the LPR is to maintain and develop their military potential. 
In effect, the lives of the so-called republics are subordinate to military goals. 
The Donbas separatism is a conglomerate of different groups of interests, with Russia at the 
fulcrum. Its representatives set the main tactical and strategic goals and thus have a decisive 
influence on the development of the situation in the region. Individual separatist groupings 
come into conflict, and some oligarchs linked to the former Party of Regions circles have also 
been making attempts to maintain their influence. The struggle between individual groups of 
interest is intensifying as the situation on the war front becomes calmer. Since the situation 
has temporarily stabilised after the seizure of Debaltseve, the central governments of the DPR 
and the LPR have made attempts to expand their influence, combating armed criminals who 
are outside their control and that of Russia. 
The civilian population is taking the brunt of the devastation caused by the war and the in-
creasing militarisation of the region. Despite the fact that the intensity of the fighting on the 
war front is falling, worsening humanitarian problems are causing  refugees to continue their 
flight from the territories controlled by the separatists. 2 million people have fled the conflict 
zone since the beginning of the war: 1.3 million of them have found shelter in other regions 
of Ukraine, and more than 700,000 have left for Russia. The region has also sustained great 
economic losses – most mines have been either destroyed or closed, many industrial plants 
have restricted or completely discontinued their production, and many firms have been taken 
over by force. In effect, the region has seen an economic downturn. 
The emergence of the so-called republics
When the Revolution of Dignity prevailed and 
President Viktor Yanukovych was ousted in 
March and April 2014, Russia started stoking 
separatist sentiments in the south-eastern re-
gions of Ukraine, and thus began to implement 
its plan to set up the so-called Novorossiya. 
In the case of the Donbas, both Moscow and 
local oligarchs viewed the protests in their in-
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itial phase as being beneficial (in Donetsk 
Oblast those who wanted to benefit most were 
Rinat Akhmetov and politicians linked to Viktor 
Yanukovych’s oligarchic clan, ‘The Family’, and 
in Luhansk Oblast the key player was Oleksandr 
Yefremov). Russia viewed the pro-Russian 
demonstrations as a factor which destabilised 
the situation in Ukraine, while for the oligarchs 
they were one of the elements of negotia-
tions with the new government. A section of 
the region’s political elite wanted thus to put 
pressure on the central government through 
a controlled outburst of public dissatisfaction 
in order to retain their zones of influence and 
main sources of income. However, the situation 
was deteriorating on a regular basis and finally 
the local oligarchs (as a consequence of Russia’s 
political decision) lost control of the way events 
played out. In effect, self-proclaimed republics 
were set up (the so-called Donetsk People’s Re-
public and Luhansk People’s Republic) and they 
have taken regular action over the past few 
months to legitimise their existence. The first 
stage was marked by an illegal and fraudulent 
referendum being held on 11 May 20141, and 
this was followed by a central government elec-
tion being held on 2 November. Neither vote 
met any democratic standards. 
Two weeks after the referendum, on 25 May 
2014, it was announced that the Union of Peo-
ple’s Republics, Novorossiya, was set up, and 
was led by a former deputy from the Party of 
1 89% of residents of Donetsk Oblast (2,252,000 people) 
and 96% residents of Luhansk Oblast (their number has 
not been stated as yet) reportedly voted for the ‘repub-
lics’ to be set up in the May referendum.
regions, Oleh Tsaryov. In theory, the union was 
intended to merge the two ‘people’s republics’ 
into one, but they have thus far functioned in-
dependently from one another, and the union 
itself exists only on paper. This situation and 
the fact that two separate political entities have 
been set up instead of one result from the fact 
that the separatist movement in the Donbas 
has been fragmented from the very beginning. 
Various groups of interest have made efforts 
to capitalise on the instability, vying for influ-
ence and access to the income generated by the 
region’s economy. Furthermore, rivalry dating 
back to the Soviet times still continues between 
Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Separate busi-
ness groups were formed in the two oblasts 
in the 1990s. Donetsk was economically strong-
er and has always tried to take full control over 
the entire region. When separatism broke out 
in the Donbas, these factors played the key role 
in the failure of the Novorossiya project as a un-
ion of people’s republics. 
Government structure in the Donbas
According to unofficial data, around seventeen 
separatist battalions operate in the so-called 
Donetsk People’s Republic alone2. They control 
either a given territory or a given economic 
sector. They make money from businesses they 
have taken over (for example, petrol stations or 
illegal mines) or from contraband – the sale of 
stolen cars, factory machines, etc. Occasionally 
the zones of influence of individual groupings 
overlap, and this brings them into conflict. In 
effect, the situation in the two regions is un-
stable not only due to military activity but also 
to infighting between various forces engaged 
in the Donbas separatism. Both the ‘central gov-
ernments’ of the DPR and LPR, and individual 
volunteer battalions are fighting for their own 
2 There are dozens of armed groups in the region in to-
tal. The best-known armed formations include: Oplot, 
Vostok, Kalmius, Sparta, Somalia (in the DPR) and Odes-
sa, Prizrak, Zarya, Vityaz, Rus, Modjahed and numerous 
Cossack regiments (in the LPR).
The separatist movement in the Donbas 
has been fragmented from the very begin-
ning. Various groups of interest have made 
efforts to capitalise on the instability, 
vying for influence and economic assets. 
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zones of influence. A part of these battalions is 
dependent on local interest groups and some 
of them consist of foreign militants (mainly 
Russians and Chechens, although small groups 
of Serbs and citizens of other countries are also 
present there), and Cossack groups. 
Infighting intensified when Debaltseve was 
seized and the active military operation phase 
ended. The central governments of the so-called 
republics made efforts to strengthen their influ-
ence in the region – their main opponents are 
Cossack groups who have shown no intention 
since the beginning of the conflict to make them-
selves subordinate to the governments of the 
DPR and the LPR. The governments want their 
respective republics to become more centralised. 
They would thus turn into a political organism 
which is easier to manage, and this will be an 
important argument in talks aimed at obtaining 
a greater degree of independence from Kyiv.
In administrational terms, the governments 
of the two ‘republics’ are trying to administer 
the territories which they nominally control. 
However, this primarily boils down to resolv-
ing current issues, such as the distribution of 
humanitarian aid from Russia. The main goals 
of the central governments include maintaining 
a high degree of militarisation in the region 
and bringing all armed formations operating 
in the ‘republics’ under their control. In effect, life 
in the occupied territories is subordinated above 
all to satisfying the needs of soldiers who have 
to constantly be prepared to continue the fight 
against Ukrainian troops. 
Administration proper in the occupied terri-
tories is performed by those authorities which 
performed these functions under the Ukrainian 
government. Most staff in local governments 
and public servants are still in their jobs, and the 
municipal services are fully operational. Many 
police officers, public prosecutors and law en-
forcement officers have decided to serve the 
governments of the DPR and the LPR. In some 
cities, working for the separatists is one of 
the few opportunities to earn a living, be it in 
military formations or in the state administration. 
However, the detailed structure of the separa-
tist governments remains unclear. It is difficult 
to determine precisely how they are organised 
and what their internal hierarchy is like. In the 
case of the DPR it is clear that the separatists 
have been able to develop certain basic prin-
ciples of co-operation between individual cen-
tres of power. Some of the groupings operating 
in the remaining part of the ‘republic’ in ex-
change for paying money (as part of taxes im-
posed by the separatists) to the Central Republi-
can Bank of the DPR3 received consent from the 
central government for further operation in the 
areas they control. One of the main functions of 
the DPR is to ensure profits to various militant 
groups operating within its territory who repre-
sent either their own interests or the interests 
of their principals (oligarchs). The consistent 
cooperation of most of these groups with the 
‘republican’ government as well as between in-
dividual groups is possible partly because their 
limits of competences and profit areas have 
been clearly set, and this means a distribution 
of sources of income which is satisfactory to 
all of them. 
Though the DPR has achieved a relative setting 
of the hierarchy between its central govern-
ment and the battalions fighting there, this re-
mains a problem in the LPR. Various forces are 
engaged in an intense struggle there. The main 
divide inside the LPR is between Ihor Plotnitsky 
(the formal leader) and various Cossack groups 
who control territories bordering on Donetsk 
Oblast4. The Cossacks have accused Plotnitsky 
3 The Central Republican Bank of the DPR, which was es-
tablished in early December, is mainly in charge of ac-
quisition of funds for the central government’s opera-
tion, and sometimes pays small benefits to pensioners. 
4 Various Cossack groups control, for example, Antratsyt, 
Krasny Luch and Pervomaisk.
Life in the occupied territories is subordinat-
ed above all to satisfying the needs of sol-
diers who have to constantly be prepared to 
continue the fight against Ukrainian troops.
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of reaping financial benefits for example from 
trade in humanitarian aid from Russia, and of 
having connections with Oleksandr Yefremov, 
who for many years was the leader of the local 
apparatus of the Party of Regions. Proofs for 
this thesis include both his past and the com-
position of his ‘government’. At present, most 
of the LPR’s government is formed by staff from 
the former local state administration, which 
to a great extent was formed by Yefremov. 
It should be noted that as Yefremov’s position 
became weaker5, part of the people linked to 
him decided to completely subordinate them-
selves to the separatists who are controlled 
by Russia. 
Ideological and financial issues are the main 
reasons behind the conflict between the cen-
tral government of the LPR and the Cossacks 
– the Cossacks do not want to subordinate 
themselves to Plotnitsky because they would 
thus risk a reduction of their profits from the 
controlled territories. In effect, clashes be-
tween the groups controlled by Plotnitsky and 
the armed groups who are beyond his control 
are seen there on a regular basis. Some of their 
leaders have been executed6. The government 
itself is unable to control the territory of the ‘re-
public’ since it does not have sufficient forces 
to fight all the Cossacks. 
The Russian factor in the Donbas
Russia’s activity was the key factor which trig-
gered the conflict in the region. It is precisely 
citizens of the Russian Federation7 who in the 
5 Yefremov himself was accused by Kyiv of supporting 
separatists. A court trial was launched against him in 
February 2015 on charges of ‘inciting ethnic hatred’. 
For more on his influence in the LPR see: http://www.
pravda.com.ua/articles/2014/12/24/7053114/ 
6 Aleksey Mozgovoy, the commander of battalion Priz-
rak openly criticised the central government of the LPR 
and was killed on 23 May 2015. Alexandr Bednov, nick-
named Batman, was killed in early January 2015. He was 
accused of bandit practices by the government of the 
LPR and was later killed together with his bodyguards 
by troops reporting to Plotnitsky. 
7 For example, an FSB colonel Igor ‘Strelkov’ Girkin, the 
field commander of Sloviansk or Alexandr Borodai, who 
served as the prime minister of the DPR for a while. 
initial phase of the operation of the ‘people’s re-
publics’ played the leading roles in their govern-
ment. It took some time until people  from the 
Donbas were put in top positions. The change 
was mainly an effect of the tactic adopted by 
Russia – when separatism was fuelled and the 
first successes were achieved, the decision was 
made to relinquish senior positions to locals 
to add credibility to the vision of a ‘grassroots 
movement’. Over time, the separatists forced 
a greater number of representatives of the lo-
cal administration to co-operate with them. 
One effect of this was the ‘nationalisation of 
staff’ of the ‘people’s republics.’ 
At present, Russian citizens primarily play the 
role of last instance in internal disputes between 
the separatists. They also decide on how mil-
itary operations will develop, setting the line 
of operation for individual separatist troops. 
The number of Russian military units present 
in the Donbas has fallen since the end of the active 
military stage. The main military forces designat-
ed for fighting the Ukrainian army are stationed 
in Russia close to the Ukrainian border. They will 
only be used at critical moments or when it is 
necessary to achieve a certain military goal. 
Russian engagement in the conflict is the basic 
guarantor for the continuation of separatism 
in the Donbas. If the DPR and the LPR had not 
been supported by Russia, the two ‘republics’ 
would have had no chance of functioning by 
themselves and presenting resistance to Ukrain-
ian troops. The key element which guarantees 
survival to the ‘republics’ is the open border, 
a section around 400 km long. This section is 
used for the regular transfer of funds, financial 
and military support, and personnel. 
If the DPR and the LPR had not been 
supported by Russia, the two ‘republics’ 
would have had no chance of functioning 
by themselves and presenting resistance 
to Ukrainian troops.
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The problems of the civilian population
According to the most recent data, around 
2 million people have left the occupied terri-
tories since the beginning of the conflict. Over 
1.3 million of them are domestic refugees, and 
more than 700,000 have fled to Russia8. Given 
the fact that around 7 million people lived in 
the two oblasts, this means that approximately 
30% of their population has decided to leave. 
Local pensioners are in the most difficult situa-
tion in the territories not affected directly by the 
fighting. They account for around 50% of the 
people living in the occupied territories (around 
1.2 million people, while the total population 
of the two ‘people’s republics’  is approximate-
ly 2.5 million). A great part of them have been 
deprived of the possibility of receiving regu-
lar social benefits from the Ukrainian state. 
The main problem is posed by the requirement 
to re-register at the offices operating in the ter-
ritories controlled by the Ukrainian army and 
then to go to indicated places behind the front-
line to receive the benefit. This trip was both 
costly and dangerous due to continued shell-
ing. In effect, many pensioners have been left 
destitute. The hunger protests seen at the end 
of November 2014 in a few places (including 
Yenakiieve and Torez) were incited above all by 
elderly people who had no money to buy food. 
At present, according to the Ukrainian gov-
ernment’s estimates, already 900,000 out of 
1.2 million pensioners living in the occupied 
territories have been registered on the Ukrain-
ian side, however they still need to cross the 
front line in order to receive the benefits. 
The separatist governments, despite numerous 
declarations made to pensioners, have paid 
pensions irregularly and to a limited extent. 
Regardless of the deteriorating humanitarian 
situation, no major demonstrations of dissat-
isfaction with the governments’ actions have 
8 Recent data from June 12 by UNHCR: http://unhcr.org.
ua/en/2011-08-26-06-58-56/news-archive/1244-inter-
nal-displacement-map
been seen in either ‘republic’ since the Novem-
ber protests. A small demonstration (around 
500 people) was held on 15 June in Donetsk. 
Its participants chanted anti-war slogans, but 
even then part of the demonstrators demand-
ed above all that the front line be moved away 
from Donetsk. Furthermore, tens of thousands 
people took part in the celebrations of the ‘na-
tional’ holidays in May (Victory Day on 9 May 
and the referendum anniversary on 11 May) 
held by the government of the DPR. It is thus 
clear that since pro-Ukrainian residents of the 
region have fled, the people living in the occu-
pied territories either support the new govern-
ments or have a neutral attitude towards them. 
The massive propaganda employed by the sep-
aratists, who represent the Ukrainian army as 
the main enemy of the Donbas, has reinforced 
the local population’s dislike of Kyiv. This pro-
cess is likely to intensify in the coming months. 
The economic disaster
Before the war, the Donbas was one of 
Ukraine’s most important regions in econom-
ic terms. Over the past few years the Donetsk 
and Luhansk oblasts generated 12% and 4% 
of Ukraine’s GDP, respectively. These two 
oblasts also accounted for a significant part 
of Ukraine’s trade – they had a 25% share in 
total Ukrainian exports and a 12% share in to-
tal Ukrainian imports9. In 2013, goods worth 
US$15.9 billion were exported from this region, 
9 Donetsk Oblast accounted for 19% of Ukrainian exports 
and 8% of imports, and Luhansk Oblast made up 6% 
of exports and 4% of imports.
Around 2 million people have left the occu-
pied territories since the beginning of the 
conflict. Over 1.3 million of them are domes-
tic refugees, and more than 700,000 have 
fled to Russia.
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while the region’s imports were worth US$9.4 
billion. Heavy industry, mainly metallurgy and 
the production of machines and locomotives, 
and the fuel production sector (mainly the min-
ing of various kinds of coal) played a dominant 
role in the production structure.
The region has plunged into economic collapse 
since the outbreak of the conflict. Many indus-
trial plants have been closed and some have 
been destroyed as a consequence of shelling. 
Others yet have been taken over by the sepa-
ratists. However, the real scale of damage sus-
tained by the industrial sector is difficult to esti-
mate. Nevertheless, it can be concluded on the 
grounds of numerous reports from people who 
still live in the occupied territories that small lo-
cal factories in many places are still operation-
al and are selling their products in the region, 
in Ukraine or exporting them to Russia. At the 
same time, work has stopped at many large 
companies in the region, including the Alchevsk 
Metallurgical Plant and the mining machinery 
factory in Donetsk. The situation in industry 
depends on how far a given place is located 
from the front line, on the militant groups who 
control it, and on the owners of given plants. 
The factories who sell a great part of their pro-
duction to Russia are in the best situation. They 
pay money to their employees, though not full 
salaries. The industry’s operation also depends 
on the intensity of the fighting on the military 
front – the increased frequency of shelling to-
wards the end of May resulted in a large coke 
plant in Avdiivka closing down; this is part of 
Rinat Akhmetov’s assets. Most of his other in-
dustrial plants which are now located in the 
‘people’s republics’ continue their operation. 
Their functioning and the related payment of 
wages to employees is the guarantor of sur-
vival to thousands of residents of the occupied 
territories (more than 70,000 people are still 
employed by Akhmetov’s plants in the ‘peo-
ple’s republics’10), and this serves the interests 
of both the oligarch and the separatists. 
Mines located in the region are in a particular-
ly difficult situation. Many of them have been 
closed down. At present about half of the ap-
proximately 80 mines located in the occupied 
territories are still running. The remaining ones 
ceased production (mainly due to destruction 
caused by shelling). Those which are still func-
tioning predominantly work to a limited extent, 
and others have taken action to resume oper-
ation. Meanwhile, production is being contin-
ued by illegal coal mines, known as kopanki. 
Their output is sold in Russia and Ukraine. 
The economic problems have contributed to 
rising unemployment levels in the region, and 
this is compounding the social problems there. 
According to a survey conducted in March by 
the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 
only 50% of the residents in the ‘republics’ live 
on their wages or pensions; the others receive 
support from their relatives and take loans11. In 
effect, work for the separatist administration 
(although problems with wages are also seen 
here) or joining their military formations has be-
come one of the essential ways to earn a living. 
Trade and services operate to a limited extent 
in the occupied territories. It should be noted 
that until recently most goods were supplied 
to the territories controlled by the separatists 
from Ukraine, where prices are much lower 
than in Russia. However, due to logistical and 
transport problems, their prices in the ‘separa-
tist republics’ are significantly higher anyway.
10 http://daily.rbc.ru/investigation/politics/15/06/2015/ 
5579b4b99a7947b063440210
11 http://www.unian.ua/society/1061590-lishe-tretina-jite-
liv-okupovanogo-donbasu-jive-na-dohodi-vid-posti-
ynoji-roboti-sotsiolog.html 
Many industrial plants have been closed 
and some have been destroyed as a con-
sequence of shelling. Others yet have 
been taken over by the separatists.
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Even the most basic products are thus much 
more expensive than in Ukraine. Furthermore, 
since crossing the front line has become more 
problematic, supplies (of more expensive prod-
ucts and those of lower quality) from Russia 
have increased. 
One of the main impediments to doing business 
in the occupied territories is corporate raiding, 
i.e. taking over companies by force. Many func-
tioning businesses have been taken over by 
armed criminals or local businessmen who de-
cided to take others’ assets, taking advantage 
of the existing chaos12. Some representatives of 
small and medium-sized businesses operate de-
pending on the intensity of the fighting – when 
military activity is less intense, they open their 
businesses. 
The separatist central governments try to profit 
from companies’ activity, as well. Last Septem-
ber, the government of the ‘Donetsk People’s 
Republic’ ordered that companies be registered 
at the DPR’s administration and imposed a war 
tax and a sales tax (from 1% to 17%), depend-
ing on the form of legal ownership. The corpo-
rate income tax rate is 20%, and the personal 
income tax rate is 13%. Furthermore, a land tax 
and excise duty have also been imposed – these 
levies have to be paid to the Central Republican 
Bank of the DPR. The separatists have also tak-
en control of all marketplaces, introducing their 
commissioners who collect charges, and have 
imposed taxes on taxi and bus drivers and the 
owners of kopanki (around US$850 monthly). 
12 The most infamous example was the takeover of eigh-
teen Amstor chain stores, http://www.epravda.com.ua/
publications/2015/01/29/524255/
Since the ‘separatist republics’ are outside the 
Ukrainian banking system, cash shortages are 
being observed in the occupied territories. Until 
the Ukrainian side introduced passes for cross-
ing the front line13, many people would go to 
Ukrainian territories to withdraw cash from 
their bank accounts. At present, taking this trip 
has become even more complicated. Therefore, 
new services have become available: these are 
points where money can be withdrawn from 
bank accounts held with Ukrainian banks. 
The commission fee depends on the amount 
withdrawn, and can even reach 15% or 20%. 
Currency exchange is also flourishing. 
The separatist governments have responded to 
the problems with cash shortages by creating 
a multi-currency zone in the ‘republics’. This 
means that settlements can be made there in 
several currencies. In theory, it is possible to 
pay with Ukrainian hryvnias, Russian rubles, US 
dollars, and euros in the DPR and the LPR. How-
ever, only the two former currencies are in com-
mon use. Their exchange rate has been fixed 
by the governments, and is 1:2 (one hryvnia is 
the equivalent of two rubles). However, there 
is a shortage of low denomination rubles, so 
the Ukrainian hryvnia is still the most popular 
means of payment. 
Conclusions
The main goal of existence of the ‘Donbas peo-
ple’s republics’ is the constant destabilisation 
of the situation in Ukraine and to put pressure 
on the government in Kyiv to amend the consti-
tution to include the two autonomous political 
13 In January the Ukrainian government reduced the num-
ber of checkpoints through which people may enter 
or leave the occupied territories to seven places where 
the front line is possible to cross. A new requirement 
to obtain a pass from one of the seven checkpoints be-
forehand has also been imposed. As the situation on 
the front line escalated in late May/early June this year, 
the number of checkpoints possible to pass has been 
temporarily reduced, and thus the transfer of people 
between Ukraine and the occupied territories has sig-
nificantly decreased – individual checkpoints are opened 
and closed depending on the intensity of shelling.
One of the main impediments to doing 
business in the occupied territories is 
corporate raiding, i.e. taking over compa-
nies by force.
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entities controlled by Russia in the Ukrainian 
political system. To achieve this goal, a high 
level of militarisation has been maintained in 
the occupied territories – the separatist armed 
forces must be ready to escalate the conflict 
at any time. In effect, the functioning of the 
two ‘separatist republics’ has practically been 
totally subordinated to armed formations op-
erating there. Profits generated by the region’s 
economy are distributed among the central 
governments, oligarchs and individual troops 
which have subordinated themselves to the 
governments of the DPR and the LPR. Groups 
which try to operate independently are com-
bated on a regular basis. Thus the term ‘war 
republics’ appears to be more adequate than 
‘people’s republics’ when defining the Don-
bas separatism, since military needs are at the 
centre of both of these structures. Continued 
struggle and further stages of escalation of 
the conflict – including territorial expansion – 
are inherent in the meaning of their existence. 
Issues linked to real administration and the 
possible reconstruction of the region’s econo-
my have been given a clearly lower priority by 
the separatists. 
Neither the DPR nor the LPR would have been 
able to function so long if not for support 
from Russia which contributed to the outbreak 
of the conflict in the Donbas with tis actions. 
An open border section of around 400 km al-
lows the separatists to receive support in the 
form of humanitarian aid, military equipment 
and personnel. They have also made use of it 
for smuggling and creating transfer channels 
for weapons and drugs. 
The military operation and the increasing crim-
inalisation of the region have led to a mass ex-
odus of the local population. Those who have 
chosen to stay, even though their situation 
has deteriorated due to the emergence of the 
separatists, are putting most of the blame on 
Kyiv. Ukrainians have been accused of shelling 
housing estates, and thus of the deaths of ci-
vilians14. Negative sentiments towards Ukraine 
have been bolstered by the Ukrainian policy of 
gradually cutting the Donbas off from the rest 
of the country15 and by separatist propaganda. 
In effect, if Ukraine regains control over the 
occupied territories, it may turn out to be im-
possible for Kyiv to include the residents of the 
territories affected by the war in the Ukrainian 
national community. 
14 According to latest information provided by the UN 
agency, 6,417 people have been killed and 15,962 peo-
ple have been wounded (data as of 15 May 2015) in 
Ukraine since the beginning of the conflict in Donbas. 
15 For more information on Kyiv’s policy on Donbas read 
OSW Commentary by Tadeusz Iwański ‘Still together but 
apart? Kyiv’s policy towards the Donbas, OSW Commen-
tary, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-com-
mentary/2015-02-06/still-together-apart-kyivs-poli-
cy-towards-donbas
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